We Need Mandatory Security Requirements at General Aviation Airports

  1. TSA has never implemented security regulations for general aviation aircraft (except restrictions on DC airspace). Voluntary guidelines (May 2004) were created by the following "industry stakeholders:" Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association (AOPA), Airport Consultants Council (ACC), American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), GA Manufacturers Association (GAMA), Helicopter Association International (HAI), National Air Transportation Association (NATA), National Association of State Aviation Officials (NASAO), National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), United States Parachute Association (USPA).

  2. Many of these same industry stakeholders have spent thousands of dollars lobbying adamantly against all proposed mandatory security requirements. They also are pressing for deregulation in an attempt to bolster their declining industry. Last year, FAA enacted new rules to make it easier, more affordable, and quicker to get a pilot’s license for "light sport aircraft." If you (1) have a state driver’s license, (2) complete ground school, and (3) log only 20 hours of flight time, you can fly a light sport plane. (The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 21, 2004, FAA Eases Rules for Flying Light Craft). No one has represented the public in these security battles.
  3. FBI and Department of Homeland Security Intelligence’s confidential report dated February 25, 2005 states that Al-Qaida, jihadist and Islamic-based terrorists groups are looking to use aircraft in "the largely unregulated" area of general aviation, including corporate jets, private planes, helicopters, and other unscheduled aircraft. (Star Tribune, March 14, 2005, Noncommercial Planes and Helicopters Offering Terrorists Particularly Tempting Targets, a Confidential Government Report Concludes.) The report concludes that "[a]s security measures improve at large commercial airports, terrorists may choose to rent or steal general aviation aircraft housed at small airports with little or no security."

  4. General Aviation aircraft can be stolen with only voluntary security requirements. Just this past June, there were two separate thefts of GA aircraft from the GA airports at Danbury, CT and Huntsville, AL. In both cases the occupants went for a joyride in the stolen aircraft; one being a drunken man and the other a 14-year-old boy, respectively. In 2002, there was the 15-year old who crashed a stolen Cessna into a building in St. Petersburg, FL. If a drunken man and two children can steal aircraft, why can’t terrorists? In fact, the US Stolen Aircraft Recovery Systems (USSARS) lists over half a dozen GA aircraft that have been stolen since 9/11 and are not recovered.

  5. Flying Cloud is a perfect example of why voluntary security doesn’t work. Flying Cloud is on the high end of the terrorist risk spectrum for GA airports according to the TSA’s Airport Characteristics Measurement Tool (Guidelines at Appendix A). It is located in a highly populated area and within 30 nm of the Mall of America, Koch refinery, and nuclear plant in Monticello. Flying Cloud is a "public" airport where flight instruction and rental aircraft are available. Given the types and numbers of aircraft operations, including aircraft over 12,500 lbs, and its runway length, it falls within a range in which it should have maximum "security enhancements" on a voluntary level. The only security is a fence and gates, some of which are never closed or locked. Seven photographs of seven gates on Wednesday, June 29, at about 9:15 a.m., without anyone around. There are no closed circuit television cameras, no intrusion detection systems, no special personnel or vehicle identification systems, and no security guards. Unlike commercial flights, there is no screening equipment for luggage or passengers and no background checks on those who work at the airport. There is no legal requirement for operators to lock their aircraft at Flying Cloud, just as there is no legal requirement for us to lock our cars. Flying Cloud, in fact, has dozens of planes that are not locked in hangers or chained to the ground.

    Anecdotal stories about easy access to Flying Cloud abound. One resident entered and had to search for someone to ask if it was okay to look at the planes. He finally found a cleaning person who responded "sure, just don’t drive on the runways." US Attorney Tom Heffelfinger rode his bike around the airport and no one stopped or asked him questions.

  6. Pending bills regarding GA security include: H.R. 2649, H.R. 4138, and H.R. 3397. In an appropriations bill for Homeland Security that the Senate passed in July, H.R. 2360 EAS (amendment SA 1106), the Senate requires an investigation and report on the following:

    (1) The vulnerability posed to high risk areas and facilities from GA aircraft that could be stolen or used as a weapon or armed with a weapon.

    (2) The security vulnerabilities existing at GA airports that would permit GA aircraft to be stolen.

    (3) Low-cost, high-performance technology that could be used to easily track GA aircraft that could otherwise fly undetected.

    (4) The feasibility of implementing security measures that would disable GA aircraft while on the ground and parked to prevent theft.

    (5) The feasibility of performing requisite background checks on individuals working at GA airports that have access to aircraft or flight line activities.

    (6) An assessment of the threat posed to high population areas, nuclear facilities, key infrastructure, military bases, and transportation infrastructure that stolen or hijacked GA aircraft pose especially if armed with weapons or explosives.

    (7) An assessment of existing security precautions in place at GA airports to prevent breaches of the flight line and perimeter.

    (8) An assessment of whether unmanned air traffic control towers provide a security or alert weakness to the security of GA aircraft.

    (9) An assessment of the additional measures that should be adopted to ensure the security of GA aircraft to scrutinize security at GA airports.

  7. Withholding Federal funds (AIP) for expansion or improvements until airports demonstrate security is a reasonable approach. Some Federal money could be designated for payment of security costs before any remainder is applied to GA airport improvements. All of us commercial fliers are already paying for Flying Cloud by the money we pay for parking, concessions and airport user fees and taxes at MSP. If I’m already paying for the operations at Flying Cloud, then I want my money to be spent on protection, and GA operators need to pay their share, too.

Data Shows that Flying Cloud Expansion Is Unnecessary and Wastes Money

Proposed expansion: (1) Lengthen, shift westward, and widen the primary runway to 5000 feet to enable larger jet aircraft to use Flying Cloud Airport ("FCM"), (2) construct a new service road, (3) construct additional hangers. MAC claims that expansion is not required to meet any projected increase in operations at FCM; it is only to accommodate larger business jets with the intent to decrease congestion at MSP. (Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") at pg. II-5). Cost of expansion: 82.9 million dollars. (FEIS at V-23)

  1. Data shows diminishing operations and aircraft at FCM. Operations at Flying Cloud have been diminishing since 1994 (232,130) and were at one of the lowest levels in decades in 2004 (155,850), the last year in which data is available. The number of aircraft based at Flying Cloud has been decreasing since 1987 and is at an all-time low of 451 aircraft.

    Number of operations

    Year Airlake Anoka Crystal Flying Cloud Lake Elmo St. Paul Holman

    1990

    67,980

    215,000

    189,910

    227,408

    66,950

    190,333

    1994

    82,500

    199,000

    185,991

    238,838

    71,000

    145,834

    2003

    		 58,108 (16% decrease from 2002) 132,144 (4.9% decrease from 2002) 98,612 (22.4% decrease from 2002) 155,837 (11.79% decrease from 2002) 54,205 (16% decrease from 2002) 131,794 (23.2% decrease from 2002)

    2004

    		 58,108 (same as 2003) 132,144 (same as 2003) 98,600 (same as 2003) 155,850 (same as 2003) 54,200 (same as 2003) 131,800 (same as 2003)



    Number of based aircraft at reliever airports

    Year Airlake Anoka Crystal Flying Cloud Lake Elmo St. Paul Holman

    1987

    153

    406

    345

    		 565

    150

    168

    1997

    179

    441

    327

    		 482

    210

    203

    2003

    190

    490

    263

    		 463

    237

    159

    2004

    163

    482

    265

    		 451

    239

    159

    Any claimed waitlist for FCM hanger space can be remedied by appropriate pricing and lease practices without a $83 million expansion. The waitlist is the result of inefficient pricing and lease practices, including (1) under-pricing leases so that demand exceeds supply; (2) 30-year leases which prevent turnover and optimal use of hanger space; and (3) the absence of reversionary leases to the MAC such that tenants retain ownership of improvements at lease termination. This also results in the use of FCM hanger space for the storage of boats, RVs, and other non-aircraft.

  1. Data shows most FCM operations are recreational and expansion is not intended to change that. Currently, only 3% of operations at FCM are business jet operations. Even with proposed expansion, that number will increase only by 5% . Expansion therefore will not benefit 92% of users of FCM. MAC has not even claimed that all of this 5% increase in business jets would result because of expansion. Remember the expansion is not necessary for increasing operations, it’s just to increase the types of larger jet business aircraft at the request of two FBOs. MAC estimates only 20 additional business jets will be based at FCM by 2010 if expansion occurs. $83 million for 20 jets.

    MAC’s estimated Activity 1999 2010 (with expansion)
    Total Operations

    234,475
    (MAC’s estimate was way over real operations of )

    302,982
    Business Jet Operations

    5,876 (3% of all operations)

    24,440 (8% of all operations)


  1. Data shows FCM aircraft do not cause delay at MSP. In the FEIS, MAC claims that stopovers from FCM account for 0.5% of operations at MSP. This numbers is minimal and clearly does not result in delay at MSP. Two Fixed Based Operators, Elliot Aviation and Executive Aviation, who claim to have stopovers, state that their stopovers have not increased in 7 years. With appropriate financial incentives, FCM aircraft could utilize the airport at St. Paul Holman Field which already has a 5000-foot runway to refuel or pick up passengers instead of MSP. $83 million to change 0.5% of operations at MSP.

  2. Data and studies show general aviation does not cause delay at MSP. Since 1994, "FAA does not consider general aviation to be a significant factor in congestion at commercial airports today." "FAA’s analysis showed . . . [g]eneral aviation was not identified as a major cause of delay." "Although congestion caused by general aviation at commercial airports was a consideration when the reliever program was established, it has largely ceased to be one now." See the 1994 US General Accounting Office Report. For example, in 1997, there were about 60,000 general aviation operations at MSP (12% of MSP operations). In 2002, general aviation operations at MSP decreased to 25,075 (6% of MSP operations). There are no individually owned GA aircraft based at MSP. Many GA operations at MSP connect passengers to commercial flights or have passengers using Signature Service at MSP, which is not available at FCM. $83 million when there is no GA delay at MSP.

  3. MAC’s studies of comparable airports show that lengthening FCM runways will not result in increased operations. According to MAC’s "Flying Cloud Airport Expansion Technical Report: Activity Forecasts 1999" none of the seven comparable reliever airports studied for comparison of a runway extension from 4000 to 5000 feet had an increase in operations attributable to lengthening the runway. Even though none of these comparable airports had any increase in operations from lengthening the runway, MAC did not investigate whether there was any effect whatsoever on the size of the aircraft using the extended runways. According to MAC’s own studies, $83 million dollars will have no discernable impact at FCM or MSP.

Northwest Airlines’ Economic Data Shows Flying Cloud Expansion Is Unwise

  1. Flying Cloud has been operating with a deficit for years. The proposed Flying Cloud expansion without FCM operators’ financial accountability will only increase the deficit to the detriment of commercial airport users who pay direct and indirect costs for the Flying Cloud subsidy. The economic subsidy at all MAC reliever airports was 7.9 million in 2002 and was budgeted at 9.6 million for 2004. This deficit is illegal under Minn. Stat. Section 473.651 (reasonable and uniform charges with regard to value of and improvements on property) and FAA policy regarding airport rates and charges 61 Fed. Reg. 31994, 32014 (airports must be self-sufficient). The reliever airports’ deficit is caused by the following:

    •     MAC reliever airports generate much less revenue than other similar size reliever airports in the nation.

    • MAC reliever airports are significantly less profitable than other similar size reliever airports in the nation.

    • MAC charges lower rates at its reliever airports than rates charged by other comparable reliever airports in the nation.

    • MAC’s sources of revenue at the reliever airports are significantly more limited than the sources of revenue at other similar size reliever airports in the nation.

    • MAC has no reversionary clauses in its lease agreements so MAC tenants retain ownership of all improvements at lease termination, whereas nearly all comparables have reversionary clauses.

  2. Economic tools, instead of the $82.9 million FCM expansion, can be used to persuade operators to use reliever airports over MSP while still increasing reliever rates. A 2004 report studying the costs of operating general aviation traffic at reliever airports versus MSP concluded that MSP is already an economically unattractive alternative for operators because of landing fees, higher fuel costs, taxi delays, and storage costs. Currently, it is nearly 300% to 450% more expensive to store a general aviation aircraft at MSP versus FCM. St. Paul Holman field already has a 5000-foot runway that can be better utilized with the construction of a dike to prevent flooding.

  3. Demand for hanger space at FCM could be resolved by more efficient leasing rather than new construction. The demand for hanger space at FCM is the result of (1) under-pricing leases, such that demand exceeds supply; (2) 30-year leases that prevent turnover; and (3) the absence of reversionary clauses in reliever leases. These problems result in the use of hanger space for the storage of boats and RVs rather than aircraft.

 

 

Toxic Emissions from Aircraft Are a Real Threat to Residents in Minnesota

The general public may not know it, but it is an undisputed fact known by EPA, MPCA, FAA, and MAC that aircraft burning fossil fuels emit toxic chemicals that cause cancerous and non-cancerous health problems. Therefore, I, the City, Zero Expansion, and other concerned residents have repeatedly commented that MAC needs to identify, quantify and address toxic emissions in its environmental review. MAC has repeatedly ignored our requests.

In the June 2004 FEIS, FAA very carefully and deceptively in one paragraph answers the issue on toxic emissions on page 42-43 of Volume II. If you are not familiar with chemistry and environmental laws, FAA’s answer seems to state that it has no obligation to report toxic emissions from aircraft under NEPA and MEPA and that the emissions do not exist.

Let me make it clear, the emissions do exist and FAA is obligated under NEPA and MEPA to disclose them. FAA is fully aware that aircraft emit toxic emissions and has known it for a long time. Various government agencies and universities have been researching this subject for years. Nowhere in NEPA or MEPA does it restrict FAA’s evaluation of air quality to those items identified in the Clean Air Act (CAA), as FAA implies in its answer. One year ago, FAA printed a document entitled "Select Resource Materials and Annotated Bibliography on the Topic of Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPS) Associated with Aircraft, Airports, and Aviation" dated July 2003. In this document FAA admits that environmental assessments of toxic emissions have taken place at other airports. How can MAC and FAA continue to ignore requests for toxic emission information at our airports?

Specifically, the concentrations of toxic aircraft emissions for an airport can be calculated by taking the known amounts of hydrocarbon exhaust specific to each type of aircraft, multiplied by the number of operations of that type of aircraft, breaking the hydrocarbon exhaust down into the specific toxic chemicals, and using a sophisticated model to calculate concentrations of those individual toxic chemicals. The calculation of specific toxic chemicals from aircraft emissions is being done at other airports and should be done at Flying Cloud and MSP too. California requires airport expansions to quantify the increase in toxic emissions and conduct a health risk assessment that calculates the numbers of increased adverse health effects from expansion.

In the FEIS, FAA tries to downplay toxic emissions by stating that actual air monitoring placed on the ground at runways at various airport has found toxic chemical levels to be the same as background levels for the urban areas. But FAA omits in its answer the logical and scientific explanation: the high heat of the exhaust coming out of the plane causes the toxic plume to rise above the ground where the monitors aren’t located. FAA itself came out with a "Final Report: The Use of LIDAR to Characterize Aircraft Initial Plume Characteristics" in February 2004 showing how aircraft exhaust plumes rise. This does not mean that the toxic chemicals disappear, only that they rise away from monitoring devices on the runways and then eventually drift back down.

Toxic emissions from aircraft are not some theory that only environmentalists and tree huggers have invented and are concerned about. In my research on the subject of toxic aircraft emissions I have spoken to various experts at EPA, MPCA, and California agencies. Believe me, it is a real issue that doesn’t go away just because MAC and FAA choose to ignore it in Minnesota. Air quality affects us all, especially children.

These are the toxic chemicals that come out of aircraft exhaust according to EPA:

  • 1,3-Butadiene
  • Acetaldehyde
  • Acrolein
  • Benzene
  • Ethylbenzene
  • Formaldehyde
  • nHexane
  • Xylene
  • Propionaldehyde
  • Styrene
  • Toulene
  • Lead
  • Polycyclic Organic Matter (POM)

EPA’s National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment used computer models from emission information in each state and determined that in Minnesota, 1,3-butadiene, acrolein, benzene, formaldehyde, and POM were at levels in excess of health benchmarks (the levels above which are thought to cause adverse health effects in adults). Recent monitoring measurements taken by MPCA in Minnesota confirm that formaldehyde and benzene in our air are in excess of health benchmarks. MPCA did not monitor POMs and is unable to measure relevant amounts of 1,3-butadiene and acrolein in the air given limitations on the monitoring equipment. MPCA also does not measure for airborne lead. See MPCA’s "Air Toxics Monitoring in the Twin Cities" dated January 2003.

What does this mean? It means that many of the toxic chemicals found in aircraft exhaust are already at high enough levels in our state to cause adverse health effects in adults. For children in our state, it is a much graver picture. Because children breathe more frequently and eat and drink more compared to their sizes than adults, and because a lot of children’s systems are still developing, EPA and California agencies are re-evaluating health benchmarks for children. They have identified adverse health effects from toxic chemicals at significantly lower levels than adult levels. These lower, child-health benchmarks include studies on benzene, lead, acrolein, POM, and formaldehyde-- the very chemicals that are found in aircraft emissions. See for yourself the alarming health impacts these toxic chemicals have on children at the following website, http://www.oehha.ca.gov/air/toxic_contaminants/SB25finalreport.htm.

Toxic aircraft emissions do exist and it is clear that NEPA and MEPA require an evaluation of the air quality impact, especially given that the baseline in Minnesota, before any proposed expansion at Flying Cloud, is already at levels that impact health. Yes, it’s true that other combustion engines like motor vehicles emit toxic chemicals too, but that doesn’t mean you ignore the aviation source. The purpose of NEPA and MEPA is to gather information to enable us to make informed decisions about choices between transportation and air quality. We deserve to know the truth about air quality and the impacts from proposed transportation.

Why hasn’t FAA and MAC given us information on aircraft toxic emissions for the expansion at Flying Cloud and MSP? (MSP emissions should be included because of cumulative impacts.) This time I can’t justify the evasion of the answer with a claim that MAC and FAA are recklessly ignorant. Given FAA’s own documents and the fact that toxic emissions are evaluated at other airports, MAC and FAA are being deceptive.

Here is a sample of some research that has been conducted at other airports to assess the amounts of toxic emissions associated with airports and resulting health risks from those emissions.

  1. LAX: LAWA, 2000, LAX Master Plan Draft EIS/EIR, Human Health Risk Assessment, Technical Report 14a., prepared for the Los Angeles World Airports Authority.

    Increased cancer and non-cancer health risks from airport emissions.

  2. O’Hare: City of Park Ridge, 2000, Preliminary Study Analysis of Toxic Air Pollutant Emissions from O’Hare International Airport and the Resulting Health Risks Created by These Toxic Emissions in the Surrounding Residential Communities, Volumes I-IV.

    Concluded cancer risk associated with 1,3-butadiene from aircraft above EPA criteria and that cancer risks are 5-fold greater at the airport fence line when compared to background conditions in Naperville, Illinois.

  3. New Jersey: Environ Corp., 2001, Screening Air Quality Evaluation of the Teterboro Airport, Teterboro, New Jersey, prepared of the Coalition for Public Health and Safety, Moonachie, New Jersey.

    Cancer risks associated with increased toxic emissions in airport vicinity exceed federal guideline.

  4. Orange County: Lindberg, David E., 1997, A Human Health Risk Assessment of the John Wayne and Proposed Orange County International Airports in Orange County, California, with John Castleberry and Robert O. Price.

    Identified increased cancer risks in the vicinity of each airport.

 

Expansion Will Hurt Property Values

MAC has never admitted nor accounted for decreased property values that will result when operations at Flying Cloud significantly increase. There is countless research on this subject matter, and many folks have submitted such information to MAC in comment periods. The fact that MAC ignores known research on property devaluation is incredulous. Is MAC being recklessly ignorant or deceptive when it ignores property devaluation? The following is a sample of that research.

Several studies show that property values are negatively impacted by aircraft to an amount of at least 0.5% for every decibel above average noise. See Bragdon, Clifford R. (1989), "Control of airport- and aircraft-related noise in the United States," Transportation Research Record; Nelson, John P. (1980), "Airports and property values: a survey of recent evidence," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy; Tomkins, J., et al. (1998) "Noise versus access: the impact of an airport in an urban property market," Urban Studies; Knack, Ruth Eckdish and Jim Schwab (1996) "Learning to live with airports," Planning; Mieszkowski, Peter and Arthur M. Safer, (1978), "An estimate of the effects on airport noise on property values," Journal of Urban Economics; McDonald, John F. and Clifford I. Osuji (1995), "The effect of anticipated transportation improvement on residential land values," Regional Science and Urban Economics; O’Byrne, Patricia Habuda, et al. (1995), "Housing values, Census estimates, disequilibrium, and the environmental cost of airport noise: a case study of Atlanta," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; Harvey, Milton E., et al. (1979), "Cognition of a hazardous environment: reactions to Buffalo airport noise," Economic Geography.

In 1994, FAA itself commissioned Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. to study property devaluation as a result of aircraft noise. It created a report "The Effect of Airport Noise on Housing Values: A Summary Report." The study found that the effect of noise on prices was highest in moderately priced and expensive neighborhoods. For two moderately priced neighborhoods north of LAX, the study found "an average 18.6 percent higher property value in the quiet neighborhood, or 1.33 percent per dB of additional quiet."

A 1996 study found that the expansion of the Seattle-Tacoma Airport would cost nearby cities $500 million in property values. The study found that "all other things remaining equal, the value of a house and lot increases by about 3.4% for every quarter of a mile the house is farther away from being directly under a flight track."

In 1997, Randall Bell, MAI, Certified General Real Estate Appraiser, Licensed Real Estate Broker and instructor for the Appraisal Institute examined 190 sales near the LAX, John Wayne, and Ontario airports. He found a diminution in value due to airports averaging 27.4%.