Local transportation research group cites AOPA for disinformation to its members
September 2005
 

Phil Boyer, President of the AOPA, misquoted and misstated information from two government organizations, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in order to support the AOPA's position that the terrorist threat for General Aviation airports is a non-issue.

In response to a Minneapolis Star Tribune article, Official urges tighter airport security, August 24, 2005 Boyer ridiculed U. S. Attorney General Thomas Heffilfinger, a resident of Eden Prairie, who referred to voluntary security measures at Flying Cloud Airport in Eden Prairie, MN as “ineffective,” as well as chiding him for having a “significant misunderstanding of aviation security.” AOPA tackles U.S. Attorney’s mistaken views on GA security in Minnesota, AOPA online, Aug 29, 2005.

Department of Homeland Security's undersecretary, Asa Hutchinson, disagrees with Boyer and said at a recent airport operator’s conference in response to a question about the perceived threat from General Aviation, "We believe that it's significant both in terms of intelligence and vulnerability." Plane and Pilot, Los Angeles, Jan 2005. )
 
Boyer said GAO recommendations call for changes at agencies, (referring to the FAA and the TSA) not airports.

Here’s another example of Boyer’s blatant distortion of the facts. The GAO report states that the “TSA was in the process of developing self-assessment tools to help general aviation airport managers develop a comprehensive security baseline for their facility.” (GAO General Aviation Security Report, November, 2004) The TSA recommended changes would definitely be physical changes at airports -not just an agency change. 


The TSA A-001 Guidelines for General Aviation Airports, May 2004 recommend airport security enhancements such as locks, perimeter controls as well as special lighting, IDS ( Intrusion Detection Systems) and CCTV (closed circuit TV) systems for better security. The TSA Guidelines also include minimizing access points for security and cost efficiency; tying gates into access control systems, reinforcing gate closures with signage, personnel identification cards; security patrols and identification checks. 

An article in Plane and Pilot, Los Angeles, Jan 2005 states that, “Many airport, and aircraft operators have implemented their own security programs, but some have done nothing at all, refusing to believe that GA airports and aircraft pose a threat to security."

In a Washington Times article March 15, 2005, Private aircraft seen as new terror target, "a group representing thousands of pilots warned that air security remains vulnerable to terrorists and released a report citing lax security surrounding airport perimeters as a key concern. The Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations said deficiencies remain in arming pilots, federal air marshal protection and missile protection. "
 
The selling point of small airports before 9-11 was that there were no security hassles compared to commercial airports. Now security at General Aviation airports has become a costly and more intrusive proposition for operators and airports, many of whom are stuck back in the days of unlimited funding and fewer community neighbors to demand quality-of-life restrictions.

What the GAO report reveals, which Boyer omits, is that the unevenness and insufficiencies in General Aviation security is the result of disproportionate security measures taken by different airport stakeholders.

The GAO report states that both the “TSA and industry stakeholders [they] spoke with stated that general aviation airports are vulnerable to terrorist attacks” and that “the security of general aviation airports remains largely unregulated.” This is because security is based on “voluntary compliance of airports responding to the TSA’s requests for the data needed to establish a security baseline of vulnerabilities.” (GAO General Aviation Security Report, November, 2004).

The AOPA Community Watch program Boyer touts is essentially an insider’s voluntary program to avoid mandatory security enhancements, additional security costs and or impediments to access.

Boyer incorrectly ascribes the GAO with a statement actually made by the TSA, “The small size, lack of fuel capacity, and minimal destructive power of most general aviation aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists, and thereby, reduce the possibility of threat associated with their use.”

Unfortunately the TSA’s revolving door leadership and reputation for dumbing down security measures under pressure from the airlines doesn’t make them a reliable expert on security. A new report from the GAO in June of 2005, “Transportation Security Administration, Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information (SSI) cites the TSA for a lack of guidance and procedures in both determination and designation of SSI.

Threat assessment is a problem for both the TSA and the FBI according to the GAO. Their report states that “neither the TSA nor FBI has conducted an overall systematic assessment of threats, to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to determine how to better prepare against terrorism threats.” GAO General Aviation Security Report, November, 2004

The GAO identifies the Department of Homeland Security and the CIA for intelligence that indicates terrorist interest in general aviation. The GAO reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (FBI) stated “terrorists have considered using general aviation to conduct attacks” and the TSA has “identified a number of factors that could make general aviation aircraft and airports vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists.” GAO General Aviation Security Report, November 2004

Despite the acknowledgement of the threat risk to general aviation by important stakeholders, Boyer excludes any reference to them in his response to the Star Trib article. He erroneously stated that no organization, group or government agency recognizes significant threats from general aviation.

The GAO report makes it very clear that one of the most significant impediments to security at General Aviation airports is because there are so many of them. Compared to the 510 commercial airports nationwide, there are 14, 296 private general aviation airports not open to the public and 4, 770 public-use general aviation airports. Public-use facilities like Flying Cloud Airport include for hire aircraft such as air-taxis, instructional and fractional operations which makes these airports more vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

The 2004 GAO report on General Aviation Security concluded that “national preparedness often begins with the private sector.” That means homeland security, the federal government, state governments and general aviation partner with the private sector to secure our nation’s general aviation airports: exactly what Heffilfinger is trying to do—partner for a safer community.

Vicki Pellar Price
Talktrans Research Group
www.talktrans.com
transportationtalk@yahoo.com